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Reclaiming our Assumptions at the Intersection of Technology, Learning and Equity 
 
MATTHEW KRUGER-ROSS, PHD 
West Chester University of Pennsylvania 
 
Assumptions: we cannot help but make them, rely on them, and take them for granted. As-
sumptions not only ground and inform our worldviews and frames of reference (Mezirow, 2000) but 
also serve as the foundational building blocks for our meaning making as human beings. For exam-
ple, for me to write this sentence I must presuppose or assume that the reader will already possess 
fluency in the grammar, syntax, and mechanics of the English language. I select vocabulary and 
phrasing that I assume will be meaningful for readers, and that will engage their thinking and sustain 
their attention. Try as we might, humans cannot interact and engage with people and the world 
around us without presupposing a great deal. Given the number of presuppositions (or assumptions, 
I use the terms interchangeably) that provide the context and texture for our meaningful lives, rec-
ognizing and naming this never-ending stream of assumptions is impossible. At some point, we 
must take a step and trust (assume) the ground will meet our foot.  
Educationalist Kieran Egan (1978) made the argument decades ago that too often disagree-
ments about curriculum are actually fundamental clashes between unspoken and unexamined as-
sumptions. For example, should curriculum be composed of the most well-known and respected 
cultural artifacts within a society? Or, should students be taught about the more localized world in 
which they find themselves? These questions point not to an unchallenged binary but rather to un-
spoken yet still guiding presuppositions. We will encounter the same concerns as we unpack, de-
scribe, and challenge the assumptions that inform our understandings of technology in relation to 
teaching and learning. 
Even though it is impossible to notice and reference every assumption made, it is useful, and 
more often critical, to clarify and critique the unspoken and almost invisible presuppositions sur-
rounding technology and educational experiences, inside and outside the formal classroom setting. 
“Technology” and “educational experiences” are too often discussed as if they were objects or 
things in themselves. This, too, is an assumption: that complex domains of human knowledge and 
experience such as technology and learning can be generalized in a single word. Even the relation-
ships that exist between the supposed meanings of technology, learning, and teaching are used in 
such uncritical ways that additional reflection and examination is warranted. To accomplish the task 
of revealing presuppositions about education and technology, and opening new possibilities for 
thinking and reflection, we must first grapple with some fundamental assumptions about intelligence 
and learning in both human beings and machines. 
 
Assumptions about Intelligence and Learning in Human Beings and Machines 
 
Blurred meanings abound at the intersection of technology, learning, and teaching, especially 
in relation to artificial intelligence and machine “learning.” This section opens up questions of the 
hidden assumptions that are made when words such as learning, intelligence, and teaching are un-
critically adopted by computer sciences and various technical disciplines. 
Our everyday use of language has steadily incorporated the vocabulary of computers and 
other technology devices (Axelrod, 2014; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). In a recent contribution to an 
online resource for imaginative education, I reflected: 
 
At the most basic level, we talk about our technologies as having “memories” and refer to 
the chips that power our devices as “brains.” We also define ourselves using the metaphors 
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of technologies: we speak of needing “down time” to “reboot”, of “networks” as communi-
ties of colleagues, and the variety of ways we can “connect” and “unplug.” These are not 
simply expressions but metaphors for how we live our lives. (Kruger-Ross, 2017) 
 
Unfortunately, these metaphors often collapse complicated differences and affordances in 
their seemingly straightforward comparisons. For example, we have titled the technological innova-
tion that allows the storage of information in computers and phones as “memory” after our own 
(projected) understanding of how our minds work. This is a helpful metaphor to explain complex 
devices and processes to a novice, but neglects other powerful contextual facts. Our own memory is 
only memory when it is supplemented and complimented by human emotions and imagination 
(Egan & Nadaner, 1988), a fact that is overlooked when we collapse the meaning of memory to a 
technological device or process.  
At present, what is truly troubling is the way that the words intelligence and learning are current-
ly being used in association with (educational) technologies.  Hubert Dreyfus was among the first to 
observe and attempt to unpack our conflation of human and machine notions of intelligence and 
learning (see Dreyfus, 1972; 2007).  Dreyfus was reacting in large part to the foundational assump-
tions being made in the field of artificial reason and intelligence based in behaviorism. Behaviorism 
is a research paradigm that believes human behavior can be studied, observed, and quantified in or-
der to predict and control future behavior.  For the first half of the 20th century, behaviorism domi-
nated North American human and social sciences (see, as exemplars, Thorndike, 1904; Skinner, 
1953). For behaviorists, human intelligence is an observable, quantifiable and controllable phenom-
enon and can be understood as a behavior. That the mental ability of human beings can be observed 
and quantified, and that these numerical calculations represent meaningfully what we term as “intel-
ligence” are two foundational assumptions behind a behaviorist perspective. Conflating the observa-
ble ability of a computer or technology with something akin to human intelligence (e.g., artificial in-
telligence) continues and expands on the presuppositions underpinning the behaviorist paradigm.  
This conflation misrepresents how we have struggled to understand our own knowledge about the 
nature and essence of intelligence (see, e.g., Boler, 1999; Dreyfus, 2007). Even more, the social and 
cultural history of intelligence studies would be enough to indicate that we should be more careful 
with our words. Alternative approaches to traditional understandings of intelligence such as emo-
tional intelligence (Boler, 1999; Goleman, 2005) and Howard Gardner’s (2011) multiple intelligences 
offer, at a minimum, greater context for entrenched quantitative research and assessment methodol-
ogies commonly associated with behavioristic social science. Boler’s (1999) research at the intersec-
tion of gender, emotion, and educational praxis offers an altogether different narrative about taken-
for-granted gendered conceptualizations about intelligence and the emotions. 
 
And Why is This So? Phenomenological Bracketing as a Critical Method 
 
Dreyfus’ critique of artificial intelligence or reason was based in phenomenology, a philo-
sophical tradition that examines the lived experiences of human beings associated with German and 
French philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phe-
nomenology aims to describe and reflect on human meaning making in such a way that always ac-
counts for context and background understandings. One way of encouraging this phenomenological 
reflection is to bracket (Heidegger, 1982) or frame an everyday understanding and repeatedly ask 
ourselves, “and why is this so?” In bracketing and critiquing the way we talk about computers and 
machines as “intelligent,” this kind of analysis reveals the assumptions underpinning the everyday 
ways we make meaning and speak about technology. We can continue this kind of bracketing and 




Assuming that technologies have capacities that mimic or mirror human abilities such as in-
telligence is not as alarming as recent shifts in the vocabulary of machine learning.  At the core, this 
category of artificial intelligences studies presupposes that technologies are able to learn. What does 
this mean? What are the assumptions being made about human learning and the abilities of ma-
chines that enable such a phenomenon to exist? Here we begin by bracketing the idea that machines 
can learn as well as the notion that this idea can be equated with human learning. Is learning, of the 
machine kind, observing and recognizing patterns, followed by a shift in next steps? Surely this 
could be understood, when applied to human beings, as a type of learning, but not learning in and of 
itself. Would it be more appropriate to refer to this capacity of machines as “machine pattern recog-
nition?” For if we continue to collapse (as an unspoken assumption) the meaning of learning to only 
mean pattern recognition and decisions based on this recognition, what is lost in our understanding 
of learning? In this way, our understanding of  human learning is reduced, limited, and overwhelm-
ingly decontextualized. While early cognitive scientists (who, by and large, adopted research meth-
odologies grounded in behaviorist assumptions) were comfortable and supportive of continued re-
search exploring the interrelationship between human and machine learning, they also made the as-
sumptions that machine learning: (1) is possible, and (2) functions in the same manner and kind as 
learning in human beings. 
For those who are concerned about the implications of online education for the teaching 
profession (see Hamilton & Feenberg, 2012), this is the nightmare coming true. Machines can learn! 
And, if all knowledge is available online and we presume that learning is simply the transmission of 
this knowledge, then teaching as we know it is dead. Current research at the intersection of artificial 
intelligence/machine learning and personalized education ignore the reductive the assumptions be-
ing made about machine “learning” (Essalmi, Ayed, Jemni, Sabine, & Kinshuk, 2015). In 1957, the 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1966) diagnosed this odd presupposition in terms of the 
difference between calculative thinking and meditative thinking. Calculative thinking is best de-
scribed as the reductive logic of propositions, proofs, and representational truth. For calculative 
thinking to take hold, in the simplest explanation, everything must be counted and quantified. Medi-
tative thinking may best be described as an attunement, or a way of thinking that aligns with reading 
and interpreting poetry or a work of art. If online learning conceptualizes and measures learning nar-
rowly in terms of calculative thinking, human beings will not be fully supported or developed in the 
wide variety of ways that they know and learn about the world. In assuming learning and teaching is 
something that machines can do, what do we lose in our understanding of learning? 
 
Learning is Earning? 
 
As a mini-case study of this phenomenological approach to unpacking taken for granted pre-
suppositions, I want to share a recent project of which I’ve become aware via a talk by Jane 
McGonigal from the Institute for the Future. The project is called “Learning is Earning 2026” and is 
a projection of what learning and teaching could or might look like in the future (IFTF, 2016). 
McGonigal presents a vision of a possible future where learning adapts and evolves according to 
recent innovations with blockchain, the technology that supports digital currencies such as Bitcoin. 
In short, blockchain provides a way for information to be chunked or blocked in anonymized way 
that can then be managed using what is called a ledger. The technology itself is built on our everyday 
ideas about currency and therefore, the system models and frames (or brackets) understanding with-
in a monetized context. For example, (1) knowledge is conceptualized in terms of market value, (2) 
knowledge is assumed to be modular and static, and (3) knowledge building is a community-
independent process. In what follows, I will bracket and analyze the language of the project to high-
light assumptions that we know are already reductive and not based in our lived experience. 
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The first is the project’s name: Learning is Earning. The title embodies the assumption that 
we learn and gain knowledge to make money or to acquire jobs. While the purpose of education 
might be, in some small way, to equip students and learners with knowledge and skills, reducing 
learning to job preparation is dangerous. Learning is not just about knowledge and skills but about 
creativity and imagination, connecting and being with other human beings, animals, and the natural 
world. Learning is more than just an epistemological journey; it can be an ontological one, as well. In 
this understanding of learning, we learn to become or be in a manner different from who we are at 
present, not just to acquire facts, figures, names, dates, and so on. 
This leads to the next presupposition underpinning this future world of learning: knowledge 
is static and unchanging and, therefore, is simply a matter of exchanging information from one per-
son to another. Again, knowledge can mean this, but it does not have to be limited as such. Learning 
is Earning frames knowledge in terms of “blocks” that can be “learned” by individuals either at 
schools, on their own during independent study, through their workplace, or with apprenticing. 
Their program collects, organizes, and syncs all acquired knowledge blocks  such that prospective 
employers can ensure the learners have what is perceived as necessary for the job. In turn, learners 
can see what kind of “block” knowledge they will obtain from their time working on the job. Jobs 
will be more like contract work, with workers jumping around from job to job, collecting blocks of 
knowledge. On the surface, and without critical reflection, this sounds like an obvious solution for 
the challenges being faced by learners, educators, employers, and so forth. But is learning as simple 
as exchanging information? Once I have learned something, gained a “block” of knowledge, do I 
know it forever and ever? Surely there will be assessments to ensure this system of teaching and 
learning is held accountable. But who writes these assessments? Whose knowledge is the standard or 
the norm? Knowledge in this scenario is drastically decontextualized from its origins and acquired, 
stored, and utilized only for employment. The (already reductive) exchange value of knowledge be-
comes its use value. All of these questions uncover the unspoken presuppositions being made about 
learning and teaching. 
Finally, what does Learning is Earning assume about how educational communities work? On 
the Institute for the Future’s website, they write that the project “re-imagines the future of learn-
ing—a new reality where instead of going into debt for a college degree, students are paid to learn.” 
A troubling assumption behind this quote is that there is no need for a college degree or systemized 
path of learning based in a community, that is, no need for the classroom or the teacher-
student/student-student relationship. Learning is earning, and it can be accomplished with little at-
tention to the lived experience of learning and knowing.  In short, it brackets the very real, lived 
human experience as unnecessary and even cumbersome. What is valued is not teaching, learning, 
knowing, and wisdom, but earning, exchange and use value, and the individualized self. Why waste 
your time and money on other human beings when you can get blocks of knowledge on the cheap? 
Getting paid to learn, building up a store of knowledge blocks, and saving on college debt sounds 
amazing!  
And, too good to be true. Kieran Egan (1997) in his cultural research into the psychological 
and developmental history of education argues that there are phases or kinds of understanding. One 
key feature of what we today understand as a higher education, Egan argues, can only come as a re-
sult of being part of a community devoted to study and learning. In Egan’s framework, this is 
known as philosophical and theoretical kinds of thinking, and it cannot exist without a community 
of learners. Science, philosophy, medicine, law—every domain of human knowledge and under-
standing—requires a congregation of human beings. This community comes together to think and 
ask questions, to critically reflect on ourselves as human beings and on the natural world. If, as 
Learning is Earning would have us believe, learning and teaching is about making money and getting 




colleges. Who needs them! Egan’s perspective identifies the value of community in knowing and 
knowledge that is lost within the framing of learning as only focused on career and market concerns. 
Overall, this process of bracketing and critique might reveal a variety of questionable as-
sumptions made in the Learning is Earning project: (1) knowledge, once acquired, is retained and 
static over time; (2) knowledge is portable and transfers well between contexts; (3) market or ex-
change value of knowledge is more important than use value, and can ultimately be conflated; (4) a 
learning system should be designed to primarily to make learning experiences and outcomes visible 
to prospective employers (as opposed to other groups or community members); and (5) the artifacts 
of our often messy and  meandering ontological or epistemological educational journeys are things 
we would want revealed to prospective employers in the first place. 
 
Turning to Equity: Why Reclaim our Assumptions? 
 
Andrew Feenberg (1999) argues that there are four perspectives toward technologies: deter-
minism, instrumentalism, substantivism, and critical theory. Each theoretical perspective embodies a 
number of unspoken and unexamined assumptions that have real practical implications in our lives 
and understandings. To this end, the two most dangerous of the four perspectives are determinism 
and instrumentalism because they are the most reductive of lived experience. Both frameworks are 
built upon the presupposition that technologies as a whole are merely means to an end, or value-
neutral. Where they differ is the ability of humans to impact the trajectory of technology. For the 
determinist, technologies are simply evolving in the Darwinian sense and human beings have little to 
no role to play in steering their development.  The instrumentalist perspective continues to assume 
that technology is a neutral tool, but human beings are able to affect the use of the tool. (Guns don’t 
kill people, people with guns kill people.) However, in presupposing that technologies are neutral we 
distort and limit human possibilities for understanding, interacting, and, ultimately, impacting tech-
nologies. 
Take, for example, text messaging.  The immediacy and brevity of text messaging, as well as 
a lack of conversational context such as facial expressions and tone, lays the foundation for frequent 
miscommunications. Consider how you might respond to the following single-character message 
from a significant other: “K.” This brief text message is meaning-laden indeed, and interpretation 
and action will depend upon the very real context- and culturally-dependent lived experience of hu-
man beings. In assuming that technologies are neutral we often overlook their cultural entanglement. 
The act of naming assumptions about how technology is defined and being used in our everyday 
lived experience provides new avenues for thinking. If we assume an instrumentalist stance, we have 
one path forward. If we challenge the assumptions regarding the neutrality of technologies, many 
pathways are revealed.  
How does this impact equity and social justice challenges related to technologies? Feenberg 
argues that through the lens of his critical theoretical perspective, technology can be understood not 
as a “destiny but a scene of struggle” (1991, p. 14). Grasping technology as a site for social justice 
requires a new set of presuppositions about technology. Brooks (2011) argues that Feenberg’s criti-
cal theory of technology (CToT) is founded on three fundamental assumptions:  
 
(1) Values embodied in technology are socially specific and not narrowly limited to efficiency 
or control technology, (2) Technologies offer frameworks for ways of life, and (3) The de-
sign and configuration of technology does not only meet our ends; it also organizes society 
and subordinates members into a technocratic order. (p. 50) 
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This critical view of technology supports and encourages democratic discussions and delib-
erations about technology and its integration into social life. In this way, Feenberg “reflects Haber-
mas’ notion of a democratic speech community but includes technological design and development 
to promote the need for a ‘democratic rationality’” (Brooks, 2011, p. 48). Whereas substantivism and 
instrumentalism position human beings at the whim of technological development, Feenberg’s 
CToT asserts that social constructivism gives human agency the final say in the way technologies are 
adopted and practiced.  
Technology is not determined to evolve in a particular direction; “the illusion of neutrality 
and autonomy of the technical professions arises from the way in which they construct their history” 
(Brooks, 2011, p. 50; Feenberg, 1996). Feenberg’s philosophy suggests that as members of a demo-
cratic society, it is our duty to engage with technological understanding and the social world, and this 
includes focused study and attention paid to issues of equity, education, and technology (Eubanks, 
2011). CToT challenges scholars and practitioners to understand the intersection of social justice 
and technologies as radically undetermined. 
 
We need to understand ourselves today in the midst of technology and technical knowledge 
itself cannot help us. Philosophy of technology belongs to the self-awareness of a society like 
ours. It teaches us to reflect on what we take for granted, specifically, rational modernity. 
The importance of this perspective cannot be over-estimated. (Feenberg, 2003, para. 4) 
 
Technology, in this view, needs to be examined not as purely instrumental, neutral or natu-
ral, but rather as a part of the framework for a more equitable way of life in our schools (Brooks, 
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